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 “A Few Bad Apples”: How the Narrative of Isolated 
Misconduct Distorts Civil Rights Doctrine 
CHIRAAG BAINS† 
Viral videos of fatal police force used against unarmed or nondangerous individ-
uals, many of them black men, are driving a conversation about race and policing in 
America. The names are familiar by now, part of a macabre roll of modern American 
tragedy. Eric Garner was choked to death in Staten Island, repeating “I can’t breathe” 
before he died. Philando Castile was shot five times in Minnesota after politely vol-
unteering that he was carrying a firearm and reaching for his license at the officer’s 
request. Twelve-year-old Tamir Rice was playing with a toy gun in a Cleveland park 
when an officer shot him in the stomach less than two seconds after arriving. A 
University of Cincinnati police officer shot motorist Samuel DuBose in the head as 
DuBose tried to drive away from the traffic stop. Video evidence contradicted the 
officer’s claim that he was dragged fifteen to twenty feet by the car. 
In each of these cases, prosecutors either declined to file charges, lost at trial, or 
dropped the case after the jury could not reach a verdict. Although the results left 
many people scratching their heads, those familiar with governing Supreme Court 
law were less surprised. With respect to police use of force, state law and jury in-
structions frequently incorporate deferential Supreme Court standards, including the 
admonition that “police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—
in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving” and should not be 
judged “with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”1 But weren’t these individuals at least 
the victims of racial profiling, some wondered. After all, the incidents almost all 
began as investigations into common, minor offenses—the untaxed sale of loose cig-
arettes, a broken tail light, a missing front license plate. Under Supreme Court prece-
dent, however, the stops were perfectly lawful, and any claim of selective enforce-
ment based on race involved a separate harm that would be nearly impossible to 
prove.2 
These cases highlight the barriers to vindicating civil rights under modern constitu-
tional law. How did it become so difficult? To be sure, constitutional rules have been 
shaped by a number of factors—text, interpretive methodologies, the jurisprudential 
commitments of the Justices, the facts of the particular cases that reach the Court. In 
this Essay, I want to suggest that constitutional law is also driven by public and judicial 
attitudes about the security of our core American values: liberty, equality, and human 
dignity. Narratives about the extent to which government threatens, or does not 
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 1. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989).  
 2. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that officer’s subjec-
tive motivations, even when based on race, are not relevant to Fourth Amendment reasonable-
ness inquiry and have to be considered under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause); Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 337–38 n.22 
(discussing the uphill legal and evidentiary battle litigants face in proving intentional race 
discrimination, as required for an equal protection violation).  
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threaten, these values can shape how easy or difficult the courts make it to enforce 
constitutional rights, how narrowly or expansively they read those rights, and how gen-
erous or stingy they are with remedies. 
The case law has developed the way it has, I argue, in part because of the domi-
nance of a particular narrative about civil rights violations—specifically, that they 
are isolated and the product of individual rogue actors, not widespread or the product 
of flawed or biased systems. One might call this the “Few Bad Apples” story of civil 
rights violations.3  
One can see signs of the Few Bad Apples narrative in the Supreme Court’s cases, 
sometimes expressed in the judicial opinions themselves, sometimes lurking in the 
background. In Parts I and II, I examine precedents involving the two broad topics 
with which this Essay began: policing and race, respectively. The narrative is perhaps 
more familiar in the policing context. Attorney General Jeff Sessions articulated it 
succinctly in a March 2017 memo ordering the reevaluation of all consent decrees 
the Justice Department had entered with police departments because “[t]he misdeeds 
of individual bad actors should not impugn or undermine the legitimate and 
honorable work that law enforcement officers and agencies perform in keeping 
American communities safe.”4 
The narrative applies with respect to race, as well, although it comes in different 
forms: the ideal of color blindness, the notion that we are living in a nearly post-
racial society, the feeling that we would finally get past our racial history if we’d 
simply stop obsessing about it. After all, we hear, slavery ended 150 years ago, 
whites and blacks drink from the same water fountains, and the voters twice elected 
a black president. In this worldview, racial discrimination is cabined to the deplorable 
acts of a few retrograde individuals.  
 When the Few Bad Apples narrative has been ascendant—as I believe it is now—
it has entailed the contraction of substantive rights and the erection of procedural 
barriers to redressing constitutional wrongs. The narrative has not always prevailed, 
however. At times, a majority of the Supreme Court has identified systemic injustice 
and reoriented legal doctrine to address it. The narrative is constantly being con-
tested, sometimes among the Justices themselves, more often in the arena of public 
debate. Our time is no different. In Part III, I briefly review how the Few Bad Apples 
narrative is inconsistent with what we know about police misconduct and racial dis-
crimination. In Part IV, I conclude by considering how constitutional doctrine might 
                                                                                                                 
 
 3. Others have identified the influence of this narrative in other contexts. See, e.g., 
Michael C. Dorf, Iqbal and Bad Apples, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 217, 218–19 (2010) (ar-
guing that the Supreme Court in Iqbal v. Ashcroft accepted the narrative that the detainee abuse 
at Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere “was the work of a relatively small number of relatively 
low-ranking military and civilian officials who went beyond the limits of the law” and “not 
the result of official policy”); Damien S. Donnelly-Cole, Note, Not Just a Few Bad Apples: 
The Prosecution of Collective Violence, 5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 159, 178–85 
(2006) (arguing for theories of criminal liability that would hold high-level officials account-
able for torture committed by underlings in U.S. detention facilities).  
 4. Memorandum from Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions to Heads of Dep’t 
Components and U.S. Attorneys (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release 
/file/954916/download [https://perma.cc/26JP-VBZT].  
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change if the Few Bad Apples narrative were to lose currency in the area of civil 
rights, and what reasons there are to think this might or might not come to pass.  
I. POLICING 
Officers have the authority to stop, search, arrest, interrogate, and use force 
against individuals. These activities are important to responding effectively to crime, 
but they are also among the most invasive exercises of government power and the 
greatest threats to individual privacy, dignity, and autonomy. In the absence of sig-
nificant legislative and administrative regulation, constitutional law has been the 
principal means of regulating the police.5 Over 130 years ago, the Supreme Court 
stated in Boyd v. United States that the Fourth and Fifth Amendment were designed 
to guard against violation of “the indefeasible right of personal security, personal 
liberty and private property.”6 The Court warned that “illegitimate and unconstitu-
tional practices get their first footing . . . by silent approaches and slight deviations 
from legal modes of procedure,” and it announced a “duty of the courts to be watchful 
for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments 
thereon,” lest those rights come to exist “more in sound than in substance.”7  
Those words can feel foreign in 2017. Today the Constitution’s protections 
against government encroachment on individual liberty are dramatically reduced. At 
least with respect to the harms that can result from police practices, the Supreme 
Court has taken what Anthony Amsterdam called an “atomistic” approach to the 
criminal procedure amendments, rather than a “regulatory” approach that would 
deter misconduct more generally.8 The result has been a piecemeal response to police 
misconduct, and one that has mostly narrowed constitutional protections and reme-
dies. In part, this trajectory has been driven by judicial attitudes about the infrequency 
of serious officer misconduct.9 As we will see, the Court’s cases reveal that, espe-
cially in recent decades, a majority of Justices have believed misconduct to be fairly 
uncommon and the need for judicial intervention to be correspondingly low.  
This has not always been the case. There have been moments when the Court has 
perceived systemic problems in policing and taken concrete steps to remedy them. 
Carol Steiker has written that the Court’s exposure to the existence of racial discrimi-
nation in law enforcement helps explain its creation of more protective Fourth 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. See BARRY E. FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT CONSENT 51, 65 (2017) 
(commenting that “it proves remarkably difficult to get legislators, who should be doing the 
job, to write rules for policing” and that police agencies’ internal policies are “not the 
comprehensive set of rules they should have”); Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court 
and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 790 (1970) (observing 
that “almost the only law relating to police practices or to suspects’ rights is the law that the 
Court itself makes by its judicial decisions”).  
 6. 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886). 
 7. Id. at 635. 
 8. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 
349, 367 (1974). 
 9. Another major factor, scholars have argued, has been judicial concern over high crime 
rates and officers’ ability to do their jobs efficiently. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Local 
Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2151–55 (2002). 
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Amendment doctrines. She has argued that “the racist outrages of the 1930s and 
1940s” explain the Court’s fashioning of a robust warrant requirement, and that the 
Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s led the Warren Court to strengthen 
the warrant requirement and apply the exclusionary rule to the states.10 During this 
time, unjustified police violence against black people was dramatized by newspaper 
and television coverage of officers turning their batons, dogs, and fire hoses on peo-
ple who were peacefully protesting Jim Crow segregation.11  
The influence of the view that officer misconduct is systemic in nature was per-
haps most evident in Miranda v. Arizona,12 in which the Court announced a new set 
of requirements for custodial interrogations under the Fifth Amendment. The Court 
began with a recitation of evidence that investigations frequently involved Fifth 
Amendment violations, starting with the 1931 Wickersham Report,13 which docu-
mented that “police violence and the ‘third degree’ flourished at that time.”14 The 
majority then noted that the Court had decided cases involving “beating, hanging, 
whipping” and “sustained and protracted questioning incommunicado” from the 
1930s to 1950s,15 and that a 1961 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
showed that physical brutality during interrogations had not yet been “relegated to 
the past or to any part of the country.”16 Just the year prior, the majority noted, a New 
York court had confronted a case in which officers pressed burning cigarette butts 
against a suspect’s back.17 Notably, the Court did not claim that such practices were 
the norm. Although the majority described them as “undoubtedly the exception 
now,” it nonetheless saw them as a systemic problem: “[T]hey are sufficiently wide-
spread to be the object of concern.”18 The Court believed it had a role to play in 
addressing the problem: “Unless a proper limitation upon custodial interrogation is 
achieved . . . there can be no assurance that practices of this nature will be eradicated 
in the foreseeable future.”19  
The Court also identified a pattern of widespread psychological intimidation, 
“equally destructive of human dignity.”20 The majority surveyed a variety of police 
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 
843 (1994).  
 11.  DAVID J. GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS 250, 399 (1986) (discussing public shock 
over graphic media coverage of the repressive police response to civil rights demonstrations 
in Birmingham in 1963 and Selma in 1965). 
 12. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 13. The Wickersham Commission, the informal name for the National Commission on Law 
Observance and Enforcement, was appointed in 1929 to study the criminal justice system under 
Prohibition and issued its report in 1931. The Commission observed police practices in the states, 
finding abusive interrogation tactics—including “the inflicting of pain, physical or mental, to 
extract confessions”—to be “widespread throughout the country.” NAT’L COMM’N ON LAW 
OBSERVANCE & ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 153 (1931). 
 14. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. 
 15. Id. at 446, 446 n.6 (citing cases where “police resorted to physical brutality”).  
 16. Id. at 446. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 447. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 457. 
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interrogation manuals, identifying a practice of manipulating and coercing confes-
sions from defendants using “an unfamiliar atmosphere” and “menacing” interroga-
tion tactics.21 Ultimately, the Court concluded that the risks of compulsion were too 
great, and that specific legal advisements were necessary to counteract the inherently 
coercive nature of custodial interrogation.22 The dissenting Justices contended that 
the majority overstated the risks. But the majority believed the problem of police 
misconduct to be widespread and acted on that basis.23 
The systemic view of officer misconduct, however, wins the day relatively 
infrequently in the Court’s cases. The Few Bad Apples narrative has played a much 
larger role. Take the Court’s jurisprudence over when officers can make traffic stops 
and arrests. In Whren v. United States, the Court rejected a Fourth Amendment chal-
lenge to the use of pretextual traffic stops to investigate crimes for which an officer 
lacks adequate suspicion to independently justify the stop. Petitioners, who were 
black, had argued that permitting pretextual stops could lead to racial profiling. After 
all, the traffic code is so expansive and so ubiquitously violated that officers have 
virtually total discretion over whom to single out.24 The opinion reflects little concern 
for this danger. “For the run-of-the-mine case,” Justice Scalia wrote for the unani-
mous Court, probable cause of a traffic violation is enough.25 
In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the Court held 5-4 that the Fourth Amendment 
does not limit officers’ ability to make warrantless custodial arrests for minor of-
fenses, even those not punishable by jail time, so long as they have probable cause.26 
Gail Atwater had been driving her pickup truck with her two children beside her, 
none of them wearing a seatbelt. This was a fine-only violation with a fifty dollar 
maximum.27 Atwater posed no danger to the community—she had been driving fif-
teen miles per hour on a street with no other traffic, and her only other ticket ever 
was a ten-year-old citation for changing lanes without signaling.28 Nonetheless, a 
police officer stopped her, yelled “You’re going to jail!”, threatened to take her kids 
to the lockup as well, handcuffed her, and transported her to jail—ironically, the dis-
sent pointed out, without fastening her seatbelt.29  
Writing for the majority, Justice Souter acknowledged that “[i]n her case, the 
physical incidents of arrest were merely gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police 
officer who was (at best) exercising extremely poor judgment.”30 He called Atwater’s 
arrest a “pointless indignity.”31 But he declined to recognize a constitutional limit to 
such indignities because he didn’t see them as a systemic ill. At oral argument, he had 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id. at 471–72. 
 23. Id. at 515, 517 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (questioning the “generally black picture of 
police conduct painted by the Court” and objecting that “the Court portrays the evils of normal 
police questioning in terms which I think are exaggerated”).  
 24. 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).  
 25. Id. at 819. 
 26. 532 U.S. 318 (2001). 
 27. Id. at 368–69 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 346–47.  
 31. Id. at 347. 
34 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 93:29 
 
specifically asked “how bad the problem is out there.”32 In his written opinion, Justice 
Souter asserted “there is simply no evidence of widespread abuse.”33 Relying on its 
perception of “a dearth of horribles demanding redress” and its conviction that “surely 
the country is not confronting anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense 
arrests,” the majority rejected Atwater’s Fourth Amendment claim.34  
The view of police misconduct as isolated, not systemic, has likewise been 
influential in the consent search line of cases. In Florida v. Bostick, the Court held 
that random, suspicionless bus sweeps by police officers were not per se 
unconstitutional.35 The majority stated that a bus passenger was not necessarily 
seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when two narcotics agents in raid jackets 
and police uniforms boarded the bus, picked him out, partially blocked his access 
to the aisle, and questioned him.36 The proper test, the majority held, was whether 
a reasonable innocent person in the passenger’s position would have felt free to 
decline the officer’s requests or terminate the encounter.37 Writing for himself and 
two other dissenting Justices, Justice Marshall challenged the majority’s analysis 
and emphasized the harm that it allowed to persist. He explained that suspicionless 
bus sweeps had become an “increasingly common tactic in the war on drugs.”38 
Officers were engaging in a “tremendously high volume of searches” through these 
“inconvenient, intrusive, and intimidating” sweeps, with minimal success in 
interdicting drugs.39 The problem, Justice Marshall insisted, was widespread, but 
he could not command a majority. 
Recognition of the prevalence of coercive police conduct was again the minority 
voice in Ohio v. Robinette. There, the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment does 
not require law enforcement officers to tell a person stopped for a traffic violation 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. Id. at 351. 
 33. Id. at 353 n.25.  
 34. Id. at 353. The four dissenters, meanwhile, feared that the “unbounded discretion” 
conferred on police officers by the decision “carries with it grave potential for abuse,” and 
warned of racial profiling and harassment. Id. at 372 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 35. 501 U.S. 429 (1991). 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 439–40. In rejecting the Florida Supreme Court’s rule that such encounters are 
automatically seizures, the majority suggested that passengers may well feel free not to coop-
erate with the investigating officers. The dissent disputed this. There is strong basis to believe 
the average person would not feel free to walk away when approached by police. See Tracey 
Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on the Streets, 75 
CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1297–1307 (1990). This may be particularly true for black men. See 
Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth 
Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 278 (1991) (arguing that 
“many black men like Bostick are unlikely to challenge or resist the requests of armed drug 
agents who appear, unannounced, inside a bus aisle seeking permission to search for illegal 
drugs”). 
 38. 501 U.S. at 442 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. 
Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
 39. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Chandler, 744 F. Supp. 333, 335 
(D.D.C. 1990), and later citing United States v. Flowers, 912 F.2d 707, 710 (4th Cir. 1990), 
for the data point that a sweep of 100 buses resulted in only seven arrests).  
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that he is “free to go” before seeking consent to search.40 Justice Ginsburg wrote 
separately to emphasize the systemic nature of rights violations. “Robinette’s expe-
rience,” she began, “was not uncommon in Ohio.”41 She noted that “traffic stops in 
the State were regularly giving way to contraband searches, characterized as 
consensual, even when officers had no reason to suspect illegal activity.”42 She 
quoted a state appellate court opinion stating that “hundreds, and perhaps thousands 
of Ohio citizens are being routinely delayed in their travels,” as officers seek 
opportunities to look for drugs or “practice [their] drug interdiction technique.”43 
Justice Ginsburg may have wanted to rule for Robinette, but no member of the 
majority joined her opinion, and she ultimately concurred in the judgment, stating 
the result was required by precedent.44 She suggested, however, that the Ohio 
Supreme Court could interpret the state constitution to require officers to inform 
people of their right to refuse consent, as a “prophylactic measure” meant to “reduce 
the number of violations of textually guaranteed rights.”45 
Whether the Court sees police misconduct as exceptional or widespread has been 
particularly consequential for the scope of the exclusionary rule, a judge-made rem-
edy that the Court can contract or expand as it sees fit. When the Court extended the 
exclusionary rule to state criminal cases in Mapp v. Ohio, it did so out of concern 
that the Fourth Amendment had become “an empty promise. . . . revocable at the 
whim of any police officer.”46 But the Justices have been deeply ambivalent about 
the remedy, resolving to apply it only “where its deterrence benefits outweigh its 
substantial social costs.”47 And if there isn’t much misconduct to deter, it follows 
that there isn’t much need to suppress incriminating evidence. 
This logic can be observed in the good-faith exception cases. In United States v. 
Leon, the Court held that the exclusionary rule does not apply when an officer rea-
sonably relied on an arrest warrant later held to be invalid for lack of probable 
cause.48 The Court explained that there was “no evidence” of “lawlessness” among 
judges supporting the application of the exclusionary rule.49 It acknowledged con-
cerns that magistrate judges had become rubber stamps for police, but set them aside 
because “we are not convinced this is a problem of major proportions.”50 In Arizona 
v. Evans, the Court held the exclusionary rule did not apply when an arrest turned 
                                                                                                                 
 
 40. 519 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1996). 
 41. Id. at 40 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 42. Id. at 40–42 (alteration omitted) (quoting State v. Retherford, 639 N.E.2d 498, 503 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1994)). 
 43. Id. at 40–41. 
 44. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248–49 (1973) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment does not require that officers inform individuals of their right not to consent to a 
search and does not require the prosecution to demonstrate knowledge of the right to refuse 
consent in order to establish voluntariness).  
 45. Robinette, 519 U.S. at 43. 
 46. 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
 47. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. 
Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998), and further observing that those social costs “sometimes 
include setting the guilty free and the dangerous at large”). 
 48. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
 49. Id. at 916. 
 50. Id. at 916 n.14. 
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out to be unlawful due to clerical errors by court employees.51 The majority opinion 
observed that the chief clerk of the local court had testified at the suppression motion 
that quashed warrants erroneously remained in the system only “once every three or 
four years” and that the clerk corrected the error in this case immediately upon dis-
covering it.52  
In Illinois v. Krull, the Court extended the good-faith exception to an officer’s 
reasonable reliance on a later invalidated statute authorizing warrantless administra-
tive searches.53 The majority wrote that there was “no evidence” legislatures had 
“enacted a significant number of statutes permitting warrantless administrative 
searches violative of the Fourth Amendment.”54 In dissent, Justice O’Connor dis-
puted the empirical point and presented a contrary narrative, writing that “history . . 
. supplies the evidence that Leon demanded for the proposition that the relevant state 
actors, here legislators, might pose a threat to the values embodied in the Fourth 
Amendment.”55 She also explained that unlike the decisions of individual judges, 
which are case specific and whose errors might well be isolated, legislative action 
“sweeps broadly” and “may affect thousands or millions.”56 Thus, she perceived a 
“greater threat to liberty” than in Leon.57 Seeing little evidence or potential for abuse, 
however, the majority was unmoved.  
In each of these cases, the Court had allayed fears about sapping the deterrent 
power of the exclusionary rule by also pointing out that the actors responsible for the 
Fourth Amendment violation—judges, clerks, legislators—were not the focus of the 
judge-made remedy. Suppression was meant to deter the police alone. The Court 
abandoned that limiting principle in Herring v. United States, where it relied only on 
its assessment of the seriousness and prevalence of the misconduct at issue. In 
Herring, the Court declined to exclude evidence obtained incident to an arrest based 
on a recalled warrant that remained in a neighboring police agency’s database by 
mistake.58 The Court could have used the exclusionary rule to pressure all jurisdic-
tions to keep their warrant databases updated—no small thing given the profound 
liberty interest citizens have in avoiding unlawful arrest. Instead, the Court held that 
the rule applied only to unlawful conduct that was “sufficiently deliberate” and 
“sufficiently culpable,” or “flagrant.”59 Negligent violations were not worth deter-
ring. Chief Justice Roberts allowed that perhaps the exclusionary rule would be 
appropriate where the errors were “recurring or systemic.”60 In this case, however, 
he saw no such evidence.61  
                                                                                                                 
 
 51. 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (declining to suppress evidence recovered in a search incident to an 
arrest based on a warrant that had been quashed but remained active in the court records system).  
 52. Id. at 15. 
 53. 480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
 54. Id. at 351. 
 55. Id. at 364 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 56. Id. at 365. 
 57. Id.  
 58. 555 U.S. 135 (2009). 
 59. Id. at 144. 
 60. Id.   
 61. Id. at 147–48 (“In a case where systemic errors were demonstrated, it might be reck-
less for officers to rely on an unreliable warrant system. . . . But there is no evidence that errors 
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These cases show that the good-faith exception has grown wider and wider be-
cause a majority of the Supreme Court has sensed that misconduct is rare, that errors 
are isolated, and that the risk of abuse is low. 
 That same reasoning has contributed to the weakening of the exclusionary rule 
in other contexts. Take attenuation doctrine. In Utah v. Strieff, the Court declined 
to exclude drugs found during a search incident to arrest, even though the encounter 
began with an unlawful stop.62 After the stop, the officer asked the man for his 
license, ran him through a police database, and found an outstanding warrant for a 
traffic violation. In holding that the discovery of the warrant broke the causal chain 
and attenuated the taint of the unlawful stop, Justice Thomas wrote that “ there is 
no indication that this unlawful stop was part of any systemic or recurrent police 
misconduct.”63 Instead, he characterized the Fourth Amendment violation as “an 
isolated instance of negligence that occurred in connection with a bona fide 
investigation of a suspected drug house.”64 Justice Thomas dismissed the concern 
of the petitioner—and the dissenters—that because many jurisdictions have 
thousands of outstanding warrants, declining to apply the exclusionary rule in this 
case would encourage officers to stop people unlawfully. “We think that this 
outcome is unlikely,” he wrote. “Such wanton conduct would expose police to civil 
liability,” and at any rate he saw “no evidence that [Strieff’s concerns] are present 
in South Salt Lake City, Utah.”65  
The Few Bad Apples narrative has had some influence over the Supreme 
Court’s use of force jurisprudence as well. A significant data point is City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, where a five-Justice majority held that a plaintiff lacked Article 
III standing to sue the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) for its use of 
chokeholds.66 Lyons had been choked to the point of unconsciousness by an LAPD 
officer. He produced evidence that the department had applied chokeholds 
repeatedly—at least 975 times between 1975 and 1980—and that sixteen people, 
twelve of them black, had died as a result.67 At first blush, it might seem that the 
Justices were simply skeptical of excessive force actions, regardless of their 
understanding of the breadth of the problem. The majority justified closing the 
courthouse door to Lyons, however, based on its view of chokeholds as a still 
relatively infrequent problem. It ruled that the chances he would be subjected to a 
police chokehold in the future were so speculative that he had “no personal stake” 
                                                                                                                 
 
in Dale County’s system are routine or widespread.”); see also Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 
586, 604 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (agreeing that sup-
pression was not required for violation of knock-and-announce rule but noting that “[i]f a 
widespread pattern of violations were shown . . . there would be reason for grave concern”). 
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the four dissenters, saw greater danger in negligent 
recordkeeping. Police have access to rapidly expanding criminal justice, terrorism-related, and 
commercial databases, she wrote, and “[t]he risk of error stemming from these databases is 
not slim.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 155 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 62. 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016). 
 63. Id. at 2063.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 2064. 
 66. 461 U.S. 95, 111–12 (1983).  
 67. Id. at 115–16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
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in the case he had filed.68 The majority also cited the lack of “any evidence showing 
a pattern of police behavior” demonstrating that LAPD allowed officers to use  
chokeholds against people who did not resist them.69 
With regard to the substantive limits on police violence, the Court’s most 
restrictive intervention came in Tennessee v. Garner, in which it held that deadly 
force could be used against a fleeing felon only when necessary to prevent escape 
and when he posed a significant threat of death or injury to others.70 Four years 
later in Graham v. Connor, the Court emphasized the high level of deference due 
to officer decision making.71 Invoking some of the very language Justice O’Connor 
employed in her dissent in Garner, which he had joined, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
wrote for a unanimous court that the reasonableness of a use of force “must be 
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 
the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”72 Moreover, the constitutional inquiry must account 
for the reality that “police officers are often forced to make split-second 
judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.”73 
This language has become a significant barrier to civil rights claims. It is difficult 
to see how the Court could have embedded such deferential terms into the 
constitutional analysis if it had understood excessive force to be a common 
problem in law enforcement.  
Subsequent decisions have shielded officers from liability for injuries resulting from 
their decisions to engage in dangerous car chases and shoot at moving vehicles, 
practices that law enforcement professional organizations and many police depart-
ments have sought to limit.74 According to one study, over 11,500 people were killed 
due to vehicle pursuits from 1979 to 2013.75 A separate study of almost 8000 pursuits 
by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) found that only 8.6% began  
                                                                                                                 
 
 68. Id. at 111 (“Absent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar 
way, Lyons is no more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles; and a 
federal court may not entertain a claim by any or all citizens who no more than assert that 
certain practices of law enforcement officers are unconstitutional.”). 
 69. Id. at 110 n.9. 
 70. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
 71. 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
 72. Id. at 396; see also Garner, 471 U.S. at 26 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The clarity of 
hindsight cannot provide the standard for judging the reasonableness of police decisions made 
in uncertain and often dangerous circumstances.”).  
 73. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397; see also Garner, 471 U.S. at 23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(describing “the difficult, split-second decisions police officers must make”); id. at 32 (warn-
ing against “second-guessing of difficult police decisions that must be made quickly in the 
most trying of circumstances”). 
 74. Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305 (2015); Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 (2014); 
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007); Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam). 
For a description of how the Court has failed in its force jurisprudence to take into account the 
police profession’s own standards, see Brandon Garrett & Seth Stoughton, A Tactical Fourth 
Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211, 217 (2017) (“[T]he Supreme Court’s post-Garner case law 
has been at loggerheads with the very fundamentals of police tactics.”).  
 75. Thomas Frank, High-Speed Police Chases Have Killed Thousands of Innocent 
Bystanders, USA TODAY (July 30, 2015), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015 
/07/30/police-pursuits-fatal-injuries/30187827 [https://perma.cc/MXG4-FRZL] (analyzing 
2018] “A FEW BAD APPLES”  39 
 
in response to violent felonies.76 Meanwhile, the Washington Post found that from 
January 2015 to May 2017, police shot and killed seventy-six people unarmed with any 
weapon other than their vehicle.77 IACP has counseled against shooting at moving 
vehicles because the practice typically will not disable the vehicle, endangers innocent 
bystanders, and can lead to officers being struck and killed.78 The Supreme Court, 
however, has treated high-speed chases and shooting at cars as tactics that serve public 
safety rather than undermine it. 
In a variety of contexts, then, the Court has been influenced by its perception of the 
prevalence of officer misconduct when ruling on questions of constitutional rights and 
remedies. At times, this factor has been an explicit part of the Court’s analysis; other 
times, it may have been at work in the background. More often than not, the Court has 
seen officer misconduct as isolated and rare, and it has refrained from constraining 
police authority as a result.  
II. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 
For years the Supreme Court ignored,79 tolerated,80 or endorsed81 explicit discrimi-
nation. In the middle of the twentieth century, the Court began to acknowledge the 
                                                                                                                 
 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration data). These included 139 officers, 6301 
suspects, and 5066 passengers and bystanders. The data are not detailed enough to track resulting 
injuries, but USA Today estimated that the number could be more than 270,000 over the same 
time period. Id. Another study of pursuits found 7430 fatalities resulted from pursuits between 
1982 and 2004. H. Range Hutson, Phillip L. Rice, Jr., Jasroop K. Chana, Demetrios N. Kyriacou, 
Yuchiao Chang & Robert M. Miller, A Review of Police Pursuit Fatalities in the United States 
from 1982–2004, 11 PREHOSPITAL EMERGENCY CARE 278, 279 (2007).  
 76. CYNTHIA LUM & GEORGE FACHNER, POLICE PURSUITS IN AN AGE OF INNOVATION AND 
REFORM: THE IACP POLICE PURSUIT DATABASE 56 (2008), https://www.nccpsafety.org 
/assets/files/library/Police_Pursuits.pdf [https://perma.cc/FMY7-E55V] (noting further that 
the pursuit was initiated in 42.3% of cases based on a traffic violation). 
 77. Wesley Lowery, Lindsey Bever & Katie Mettler, Police Have Killed Nearly 200 
People Who Were in Moving Vehicles Since 2015, Including 15-Year-Old Jordan Edwards, 
WASH. POST (May 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017 
/05/03/police-have-killed-nearly-200-people-who-were-in-moving-vehicles-since-2015-
including-15-year-old-jordan-edwards [https://perma.cc/BGM3-3EDB].  
 78. IACP NAT’L LAW ENF’T POLICY CTR., USE OF FORCE 7 (2006), https://assets 
.documentcloud.org/documents/2303827/useofforcepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/VG9S-HASE].  
 79. See, e.g., Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (holding no constitutional viola-
tion because there was no state action where county clerk refused to provide black voter an 
absentee ballot based on Texas Democratic Party resolution to restrict party membership to 
whites), overruled by Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).  
 80. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223 (1944) (holding that 
Korematsu was excluded from designated area “not . . . because of hostility to him or his race,” 
but “because we are at war with the Japanese Empire”); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896) (propounding the separate-but-equal doctrine); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) 
(announcing state action requirement for regulation under the enforcement clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and invalidating the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited pri-
vate discrimination in access to accommodations, transportation, and theaters).  
 81. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856) (holding that black people, 
who were “so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect,” 
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depth of racial inequality and take action to address it. At a certain point, a majority of 
the Justices simply could not defend the subordination of nonwhite people that was 
written into law and entrenched in American social and political institutions. Very 
quickly, however, the Court retreated from the view of racism as a systemic problem 
and began to treat it as the province of a minority of bad actors—the Few Bad Apples  
whose animus distinguished them from the vast majority of the population.  
When the Court did read the Constitution’s protections for people of color more 
broadly, it was influenced by an understanding that discrimination was 
widespread.82 It did not always make that understanding explicit, though. At times, 
the Court worked to undo racial harms without discussing race at all. In Powell v. 
Alabama, the Court established the due process right to effective counsel in capital 
cases and vacated the convictions of the Scottsboro boys, a group of black youths 
whose attorneys had been appointed the morning of trial.83 Although the Court 
noted that the defendants were “negro,” race did not factor into its written legal 
analysis.84 And yet the centrality of race to the Court’s decision to intervene in the 
railroading of black capital defendants was unmistakable. The defendants were 
falsely accused of raping two white women, a charge that routinely inspired white 
mob violence and lynchings at the time, and the case was discussed around the 
world as an example of America’s racism.85 Michael Klarman has suggested that 
the intense national focus on racialized violence in the form of lynching during this 
period likely influenced the Justices to invalidate state capital convictions that were 
“just one step removed from lynching,” or “legal lynching.”86 He has argued 
persuasively that this backdrop helps explain the Court’s vacating state court 
convictions of southern black defendants on constitutional grounds not only in 
                                                                                                                 
 
could not be citizens). 
 82. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 
80 VA. L. REV. 7, 14 (1994) (arguing that “deep-seated social, political, and economic forces 
had already begun to undermine traditional American racial attitudes” before the Court’s 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education). 
 83. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 84. It’s also true that the Court rejected other challenges to the prevailing racial order 
during this era. See Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) (upholding the poll tax); 
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (deeming the white primary constitutional); Gong 
Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (upholding the exclusion of a Chinese student from a 
whites-only public high school and thereby sanctioning school segregation); United States 
v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (holding an Indian Sikh man ineligible for American 
citizenship because, although he might have been Caucasian, he was not white); Ozawa v. 
United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922) (holding a Japanese man ineligible for American 
citizenship because, although he appeared white, he was not Caucasian).  
 85. See Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 
MICH. L. REV. 48, 53–54 (2000) (“In the South during this period, the mere allegation by a 
white woman that she had been raped by a black man generally was the equivalent of 
conviction.”). 
 86. Id. at 53; see also id. at 60–61 (discussing the resurgence in lynchings during and 
after World War I and the increasing support for federal antilynching law, and suggesting 
that “[j]ust as Republican congressmen were motivated by the recent epidemic of anti-black 
violence to condemn lynching, so may similarly-minded Supreme Court Justices have been 
prompted to take action against lynching’s close cousin, mob-dominated trials”). 
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Powell, but also in Norris v. Alabama,87 Moore v. Dempsey,88 and Brown v. 
Mississippi.89 All involved mob-dominated trials in which 
the proceedings were rushed and guilty verdicts by white juries were foreordained. 
Another example is Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, in which the Court 
outlawed poll taxes under the Equal Protection Clause.90 Just seven years before 
Harper, the Court had rejected a facial challenge to a literacy test in Lassiter v. 
Northampton County Board of Elections despite ample evidence that such tests were 
designed to suppress black voting.91 In Lassiter, the Court applied rational basis re-
view and found the county’s test was reasonably related to the legitimate government 
interest of having an intelligent electorate.92 Rather than acknowledge the racist pur-
pose and effect of the myriad vote suppression devices then in use throughout the 
South—that is, do what it did not do in Lassiter—the Harper Court departed from 
Lassiter in other ways. It treated voting as a fundamental right and wealth as a near-
suspect class.93 It effectively applied strict scrutiny rather than rational basis re-
view.94 And it found no relationship between wealth and intelligent participation in 
elections, even though wealth correlated with literacy.95 The Court declined to ana-
lyze the poll tax as a form of racial discrimination,96 and yet the historical context 
suggests that race played a significant role. Three Justices, who initially helped form 
a majority that would have denied the challengers’ appeal and upheld the poll tax, 
switched their vote the day after police attacked black civil rights marchers trying to 
cross the Edmund Pettus Bridge in Selma, Alabama.97 
                                                                                                                 
 
 87. 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (holding that the exclusion of blacks from grand or petit jury 
based on race violates the Equal Protection Clause).  
 88. 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (holding that convictions obtained under mob pressure violate 
the Due Process Clause). 
 89. 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding that the Due Process Clause forbids using a 
confession obtained through torture). 
 90. 383 U.S. 663 (1966), overruling in part Breedlove v. Shuttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937) 
(unanimously upholding Georgia poll tax for voting in state elections).  
 91. 360 U.S. 45 (1959). 
 92.  Id. Like many literacy tests at the time, Northampton County’s had a grandfather 
clause exempting those with a family member who voted prior to 1867. The county had 
conceded that its grandfather clause was unconstitutional, but wanted to continue to use it 
for what it claimed were nondiscriminatory reasons. Id. at 45–46.  
 93. Harper, 383 U.S. at 667. 
 94. See id. at 670. 
 95. Id. at 666–67. 
 96. Id. at 666 n.3 (“While the ‘Virginia poll tax was born of a desire to disenfranchise 
the Negro’ . . . , we do not stop to determine whether on this record the Virginia tax in its 
modern setting serves the same end.”) (quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 543); 
id. at 672 (Black, J., dissenting) (observing that the Court’s ruling “is to no extent” based 
on the use of the poll tax to disenfranchise voters due to race). 
 97.  See Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou, Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The 
People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 113–16 (2009); see also Burt Neuborne, 
The Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 82–83 (2010) 
(arguing that race exerted a “gravitational pull” on the Court in Harper but that the Court 
invalidated the poll tax on other grounds because of the difficulty of proving racially 
discriminatory purpose). 
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At other times, the Court strived to appear not to be reacting to systemic societal 
discrimination while doing exactly that. For example, in Sweatt v. Painter, in which 
the Court unanimously ordered the admission of a black applicant to the all-white 
University of Texas Law School, the Court insisted it was not addressing group rights 
or taking on the institution of segregated education sanctioned by its own prior deci-
sions.98 Heman Marion Sweatt had been denied admission to the law school on ac-
count of his race. In the midst of the litigation, Texas created a new law school for 
black students to satisfy the standards of the Equal Protection Clause under the 
separate-but-equal rule of Plessy v. Ferguson. The Court found that the schools were 
unequal in all relevant respects—facilities, course options, prestige, and alumni net-
work.99 It therefore required Sweatt’s admission to the white law school to ensure 
rights “personal” to Sweatt “as an individual.”100 The Court claimed the case did not 
require it to reconsider the rule of Plessy.101 Unquestionably, however, its decision 
struck a blow against racial exclusion in education at large and paved the way for 
dismantling the legal foundation of segregation.102  
In some cases, the Court has directly acknowledged the systemic nature of racial 
subordination and facilitated systemic remedies. The most prominent example is the 
Court’s repudiation of its separate-but-equal doctrine in Brown v. Board of 
Education.103 There the Court took a deliberately systemic view of school segrega-
tion, noting that it “has long been a nationwide problem, not merely one of sectional 
concern.”104 The Court likewise understood the far-reaching consequences of such 
segregation. It discussed “the importance of education to our democratic society” 
and explained that “its present place in American life throughout the nation” was an 
indispensable part of the equal protection analysis.105 The Court grasped the depth of 
the harm caused by segregation106 and resolutely announced, “Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal.”107 
When later confronted with the widespread failure of school systems to desegregate, 
the Court authorized broad judicial remedies. In Green v. County School Board of New 
Kent County, the Court ruled that a school assignment plan based on students’ choice 
between two schools failed to address the violation of equal protection.108 The Court 
criticized the school board for “deliberate perpetuation of the unconstitutional dual 
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
 99. Id. at 633–34. 
 100. Id. at 635 (quoting Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938)).  
 101. Id. at 635–36. 
 102. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 205–06 (2004) (arguing that Sweatt “functionally 
overruled Plessy with regard to higher education” and “nullified segregation in higher 
education”).  
 103. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 104. Id. at 491 n.6. 
 105. Id. at 492–93. 
 106. Id. at 494 (“To separate [black children] from others of similar age and qualifications 
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community 
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”). 
 107. Id. at 495. 
 108. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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system” and called the failure “at this late date” of any meaningful effort to desegregate 
“intolerable.”109 The Court demanded an effective plan “now” and authorized the 
district court to retain jurisdiction of the case until “state-imposed segregation has been 
completely removed.”110 Three years later, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board 
of Education, the Court again lamented the “[d]eliberate resistance” and “dilatory 
tactics” of school boards since the remedial decision of Brown II.111 Confirming the 
broad authority of district courts to order changes—including changes that were 
“administratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations” and that 
“impose burdens on some”—the Court upheld mandatory busing and rezoning as 
appropriate means to bring about integration.112  
In this period, the Court’s grasp of the breadth and depth of racial subordination 
also influenced its decisions to uphold landmark civil rights legislation. These cases 
required the Court to consider the factual predicate for Congress’s authority to act 
pursuant to its Commerce Clause power and under the enforcement clauses of the 
Reconstruction Amendments. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the 
decision upholding the public accommodations title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
the Court relied on a congressional record “replete with evidence” that black travelers 
were denied accommodations “nationwide.” 113 Upholding the constitutionality of 
the Voting Rights Act in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court noted that 
Congress passed the Act “to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, 
which has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a cen-
tury.”114 Given the “variety and persistence” of discrimination in voting, the Court 
explained, Congress’s dramatic and “decisive” action in enacting “an array of potent 
weapons against the evil” was a constitutional exercise of Section 2 of the Fifteenth 
Amendment.115 Two years later, when the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1982’s prohi-
bition on discrimination in real estate rental and sales was meant to reach beyond 
state action, it relied on evidence that Congress considered “the prevalence of private 
hostility toward Negroes” at the time of the law’s passage in 1866. The Court also 
concluded that the statute was a legitimate exercise of Congress’s enforcement power 
under the Thirteenth Amendment.116 
These cases were driven, in large part, by the Court’s recognition that racial 
subordination resulted from resilient power structures and widespread cultural atti-
tudes. It was not simply the product of isolated and malevolent jurors, school board 
officials, and voter registrars.  
Although the Court analyzed cases and took remedial action based on a more sys-
temic view of racial discrimination at the height of the civil rights era, it soon began 
to retreat from that approach. Very quickly, three related strains to the Court’s race 
jurisprudence developed: a belief that the Constitution protected only against inten-
tional discrimination; a commitment to a “color-blind Constitution” that eschewed 
                                                                                                                 
 
 109. Id. at 438. 
 110. Id. at 439–40. 
 111. 402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971).  
 112. Id. at 28–31. 
 113. 379 U.S. 241, 252–53 (1964).  
 114. 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).  
 115. Id. at 311, 335.  
 116. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 428, 438–44 (1968).  
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race-conscious remedies; and a view that pernicious racial discrimination was a thing 
of the past, reducing the need for judicial intervention.  
The most consequential part of this retrenchment was the Court’s narrowing of 
the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection. Over time, the Court interpreted the 
Equal Protection Clause to cover only purposeful discrimination, making it nearly 
impossible to challenge racial disparities produced by facially neutral decision 
making, no matter how severe. In 1973 in Keyes v. School District No. 1, the first 
Supreme Court case involving school segregation not pursuant to a statutory scheme, 
the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause required a showing of “purpose or 
intent to segregate.”117 The majority declined Justice Powell’s invitation to abandon 
“the de facto/de jure distinction nurtured by the courts,” which he characterized as 
“a legalism rooted in history rather than present reality” and blamed for inhibiting 
desegregation outside of the South.118 The following year, in Milliken v. Bradley, the 
Court held that a district court could not order a multidistrict desegregation plan to 
cure de jure segregation in one district without finding the same infirmity in other 
districts that would be affected, even if the result would be to leave schools in the 
inner core of a metropolitan area all black and surrounding suburban schools all 
white.119  
The Court later relied on these cases in articulating the general principle, in 
Washington v. Davis, that equal protection challenges to facially neutral government 
action that had a racially disproportionate impact would succeed only if plaintiffs 
could prove a racially discriminatory purpose.120 As the Court further articulated in 
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, a challenge to a state hiring preference for vet-
erans based on the foreseeability of its disparate impact on women, the Equal 
Protection Clause prohibited only government action taken “because of, not merely 
in spite of, its adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”121 That requirement has 
since frustrated many a challenge to stark racial disparities, including in City of 
Mobile v. Bolden, where an at-large election system produced only white city council 
members despite a black population of thirty-five percent,122 and McCleskey v. 
Kemp, where the Court denied the constitutional relevance of statistical evidence that 
capital sentencing in Georgia depended to a striking extent on race.123 As Reva Siegel 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) (emphasis omitted).  
 118. Id. at 218–19 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (italics omitted); 
see also id. at 216 (Douglas, J., opinion) (“I think it is time to state that there is no constitu-
tional difference between de jure and de facto segregation, for each is the product of state 
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 119. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 
 120. 426 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1976); see also Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. 
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 121. 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 122. 446 U.S. 55, 66–67 (1980). 
 123. 481 U.S. 279, 292–97 (1987). The study, conducted by David Baldus, looked at over 
2000 cases from 1973 to 1979. It found that prosecutors charged the death penalty in 70% of 
cases with black defendants and white victims, 32% of cases involving white defendants and 
white victims, 19% of cases with white defendants and black victims, and 15% of cases in-
volving black defendants and black victims. Id. at 287. The defendant was sentenced to death 
in those same categories 22%, 8%, 3%, and 1% of the time, respectively. Id. at 286. 
Controlling for 230 variables, Baldus found that a death sentence was 4.3 times as likely for a 
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has described, the Court’s purpose-based equal protection jurisprudence fails to 
account for the reality that most people either hide their biases or are unaware of 
them. The result is that “most race-dependent governmental decisionmaking will 
elude equal protection scrutiny.”124  
At the same time that the Court limited the reach of the Equal Protection Clause 
to remedy disparities experienced by racial minorities, it strengthened the Clause 
as a means for white plaintiffs to challenge race-conscious affirmative action 
programs. The Court’s decisions rested on the ideal of the color-blind Constitution, 
under which any consideration of race would be inherently suspect and subject to 
strict scrutiny.  
 In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, a splintered Court 
invalidated the use of racial quotas in public university admissions. In the process, 
Justice Powell opined that all uses of race should be subject to strict scrutiny and 
that remedying the effects of “societal discrimination” against racial minorities was 
not a compelling state interest.125 The four dissenters urged that statements that the 
Constitution is color-blind “must be seen as aspiration rather than as description of 
reality.”126 They warned that color blindness would “become myopia which masks 
the reality that many ‘created equal’ have been treated within our lifetimes as 
inferior both by the law and by their fellow citizens.”127 And they argued that racial 
classifications designed to remedy discrimination should be subject to the more 
forgiving intermediate scrutiny.128 The Court rejected that view, and adopted 
Justice Powell’s, in Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company, holding that all state and 
local affirmative action programs were subject to strict scrutiny.129 The Court later 
                                                                                                                 
 
defendant who killed a white victim as for one who killed a black victim. Id. at 287–88. 
Nonetheless, the Court rejected McCleskey’s challenge, holding that he had failed to prove 
“that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose.” Id. at 292 
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 125. 438 U.S. 265, 307–10 (1978).  
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extended strict scrutiny to federal programs, overruling a four-year-old precedent 
after four of the Justices in the majority resigned.130 
By 2007, the Constitution as color-blind had become ascendant on the Supreme 
Court. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 , 
the Supreme Court struck down voluntary school integration programs because 
they relied partly on race for student assignments.131 Rejecting the use of race-
conscious remedies for racial harms, Chief Justice Roberts wrote for himself and 
three other Justices that the rule of Brown compelled this result: “What do the racial 
classifications at issue here do, if not accord differential treatment on the basis of 
race?”132 In his concurrence, Justice Thomas likewise extolled “the colorblind 
Constitution,” calling it “the rallying cry for the lawyers who litigated Brown,” and 
compared the dissenters to segregationists.133 Chief Justice Roberts also announced 
his view of the way forward: “The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race 
is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”134  
Justice Sotomayor disputed this position in her dissent in Schuette v. Coalition 
to Defend Affirmative Action, where the Court rejected an equal protection 
challenge to a Michigan state constitutional amendment barring affirmative 
action.135 “Race matters,” she insisted. “The way to stop discrimination on the basis 
of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race,” rather than to “s it 
back and wish away . . . racial inequality.”136 Her position did not carry the day in 
Schuette and has remained the minority view on the Court. Although last term, to 
the surprise of many, the Court upheld the use of race in public university 
admissions, it permitted race to be a factor only in the name of diversity and only 
in the narrowest of circumstances. The prevailing narrative on the Court 
concerning race has continued to be that broad, indefensible discrimination 
warranting judicial intervention is rare, and that race-conscious corrective action 
is nearly indistinguishable from racism.137  
A sentiment closely related to the ideal of the color-blind Constitution is that 
we are, in fact, approaching a post-racial society. The Constitution need not 
provide race-conscious remedies for racial discrimination, the idea goes, because 
race is becoming less salient on its own, and to emphasize the role of race would 
be to reverse that progress. This theme came through most clearly in Shelby County 
v. Holder, where the Court dismantled the most effective protection against voting 
discrimination this country has ever known.138 In striking down the Voting Rights 
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Act’s coverage formula for preclearance, Chief Justice Roberts explained that “[o]ur 
country has changed.”139 Coverage was based on “decades-old data and eradicated 
practices”; the formula no longer spoke to “current conditions.”140 The formula 
therefore violated the little-known principle of equal sovereignty among the states. 
In short, ours was now a very different nation, one in which discrimination against 
states mattered more than discrimination against racial minorities. 
The result is a Court that does not deny the existence of racial discrimination, but 
that sees it as rare and the product of individual bad actors. It is a Court that will 
endorse remedial action, but only when the racism is blatant and undeniable.  
Hence, two years ago the Court was willing to find discrimination in jury 
selection in Foster v. Chatman, where a capital defendant’s attorneys located 
smoking-gun evidence that the prosecutor’s office struck black jurors based on 
race.141 Documents showed that the prosecution had highlighted the names of the 
five black individuals on the venire list in bright green, had placed an “N” for “no” 
next to each one of them, had listed them as the first five on a six-person list of 
“definite Nos,” and had considered whom to permit to remain “if we had to pick a 
black juror.”142 This past term, in Buck v. Davis, the Court granted habeas relief to 
a capital defendant whose attorneys called an expert to testify that he was 
statistically more likely to act violently in the future—an aggravating factor 
necessary for a death sentence to be imposed—because he is black.143 And in Peña-
Rodriguez v. Colorado last year, the Court created a narrow exception to the no-
impeachment rule against inquiring into jury deliberations “where a juror makes a 
clear statement that indicates he or she relied on racial stereotypes or animus to 
convict a criminal defendant.”144 In that case, one juror had told the others that he 
thought the defendant had committed the alleged sexual assault “because he’s 
Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want.”145  
Virtually anyone would agree these cases involve abhorrent conduct. They are 
also all examples of one-off constitutional violations. The vindication of these indi-
viduals’ rights should not obscure the fact that the Court applied legal tests 
designed to capture only the most exceptional violations. Driven by a view of 
racism as the product of animus, the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence offers 
rather anemic protection to members of groups subjected to past and continuing 
discrimination based on race.146 
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III. EXAMINING THE NARRATIVE  
The problem with the Few Bad Apples narrative—that police misconduct is iso-
lated and insignificant, that racial discrimination is a historical and dwindling prob-
lem—is that it does not an accurately describe contemporary America. Returning to 
how I started this Essay, consider the experience of people of color vis-à-vis law 
enforcement. A growing body of evidence indicates that patterns of unequal 
treatment have resulted from a variety of factors—program-level decisions about 
where and when to deploy police resources, conscious and unconscious bias, and 
failures of internal accountability systems—that are insufficiently addressed by the 
bad actor theory of constitutional regulation.  
Data sets with sufficient integrity to be subjected to rigorous analysis and large 
enough to be illuminating are uncommon. But that is changing. A recent study by the 
Stanford Open Policing Project of sixty million stop and search records from agencies 
in twenty states, between 2011 and 2015, found significant racial disparities. After 
controlling for gender, age, and location, the researchers found that black drivers are 
stopped at higher rates, that black and Latino drivers are more likely to be ticketed and 
arrested, and that both groups are twice as likely to be searched as whites. Using search 
rates and hit rates (how often contraband is found), the researchers also found that 
officers required less suspicion to search black and Latino drivers.147 
These results are consistent with findings in high-profile private litigation and 
Department of Justice (DOJ) investigations into police departments. In 2013, Judge 
Shira Scheindlin ruled that the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk practice resulted in a pattern 
of unconstitutional stops in violation of the Fourth Amendment and racial profiling 
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.148 The number of pedestrian stops made 
by NYPD skyrocketed from 97,000 in 2002 to 686,000 in 2011.149 In the 4.4 
million stops conducted between 2004 and 2012, 52% of those stopped were black, 
31% were Hispanic, and 10% were white. In 2010, the city was 23% black, 29% 
Hispanic, and 33% white. The disparities persisted when researchers controlled for 
other relevant variables.150 Although the City defended the disparities by noting 
that minorities were disproportionately represented in the criminal suspect 
population, Judge Scheindlin rejected this argument because “the stopped 
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population is overwhelmingly innocent.”151 Only 12% of stops resulted in a 
summons or arrest; 88% entailed no further law enforcement action.152 Police 
recovered guns only 0.1% of the time and other contraband 1.8% of the time. 
Meanwhile, searches had higher rates in recovering contraband for whites than for 
blacks and Hispanics.153 Officers also appeared to be stopping people without 
regard to a specific criminal offense. As the program ramped up from 2004 to 2009, 
the percentage of stops in which officers did not list suspicion of a specific crime 
on their stop forms rose from 1% to 36%.154  
An ACLU of Massachusetts review of Boston Police Department data from 2007 
to 2010 also found serious disparities. Although blacks were less than a quarter of 
the city’s population, they accounted for 63.3% of stops, frisks, and searches. The 
racial disparities “persisted even after controlling for crime and other non-race fac-
tors.”155 Studies of traffic stops in Maryland, New Jersey, and Ohio in the 1990s 
similarly found significant racial disparities.156 In addition, new data reveal dispari-
ties in the use of force. A 2016 study from the Center for Policing Equity examining 
19,000 use of force reports from twelve cities from 2010 to 2015 found that blacks 
were more likely than whites to be subjected to force, even when controlling for the 
demographics of criminal offending.157 
DOJ investigations likewise have marshaled hard data to establish patterns and 
practices of unconstitutional conduct in police departments across the country.158 
Where these investigations have identified patterns of violations, they have also 
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identified root causes in city policy and systems failures within the police depart-
ment. In Ferguson, Missouri, DOJ alleged a pattern of First Amendment violations; 
unlawful stops, searches, arrests; excessive force; race discrimination; and due pro-
cess and equal protection violations in the operation of the municipal court.159 DOJ 
found that the misconduct stemmed from a policy choice by the city’s civilian lead-
ers: the decision to use its criminal justice system to generate revenue, with police 
officers ramping up ticketing, the court imposing burdensome fines and fees, and the 
city relying on arrest and incarceration as the means of debt collection. The focus on 
revenue generation led policing in Ferguson to become overly aggressive, unmoored 
from community relationships, and prone to violating constitutional rights in 
everyday encounters.160  
In Baltimore, DOJ found that the city’s investment in zero-tolerance policing and 
“clearing corners” led to a pattern of unconstitutional stops and arrests, among other 
problems. In a city of 620,000, the police department made hundreds of thousands 
of stops per year concentrated in black neighborhoods. Only 3.7% of pedestrian stops 
resulted in citation/arrest. Over a six-year period, the prosecutor’s office rejected 
11,000 charges. DOJ found that over 400 people were stopped ten or more times, and 
95% of them were black. One man was stopped more than thirty times, and yet was 
never cited or charged. Investigators found disparities in charge of arrest, as well. 
Ninety-one percent of failure to obey charges, 89% of false statement charges, and 
84% of disorderly conduct charges were against African Americans. They were ar-
rested at five times the rate of others for drug possession, even though surveys 
showed they used drugs at similar rates as other groups.161  
In Chicago, DOJ identified a pattern of excessive force, including shooting at 
people who were fleeing and posed no immediate threat to officers or the public. The 
investigation revealed that officers used force “almost ten times more often against 
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blacks than against whites,” and that the complete breakdown in the police depart-
ment’s accountability mechanisms had allowed the unconstitutional practices to 
proliferate.162  
In each of these cases, the problems of unconstitutional police activities and 
racial discrimination were systemic in nature—not the unfortunate choices of 
isolated bad actors.  
IV. ENVISIONING THE FUTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION 
I have argued that narratives in civil rights law concerning the prevalence of 
misconduct have shaped judicial doctrine. Without a doubt, other forces are at 
work, including interpretive methodologies and the commitment to stare decisis, 
but it would be a mistake to ignore the role of the Few Bad Apples narrative in the 
development of doctrines underprotective of constitutional values.  
If this is right, then we might expect a change in the prevailing narrative to help 
produce changes in constitutional law. If the average American, and the average 
judge or Justice, came to see civil rights violations as systemic in nature, the 
judiciary might eventually reconsider some of the restrictions it has placed on 
constitutional claims.  
For example, the Court might reconsider its view of what encounters with police 
officers are and are not consensual.163 It might rethink Whren’s permissive attitude 
toward pretextual stops in light of evidence that unfettered police discretion, the 
concentration of police activity in black and Latino neighborhoods, and 
unconscious bias have led to racial profiling.164 It might implement Akhil Amar’s 
suggestion that the racially disparate impact of police search and seizure practices 
should be considered in the reasonableness analysis under the Fourth 
Amendment.165 In the force context, the Court might provide greater content to the 
indeterminate reasonableness standard of Graham v. Connor,166 relax its 
requirement that civil rights plaintiffs plead facts nearly identical to those 
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previously held unconstitutional in order to survive qualified immunity,167 or clarify 
that its “split-second judgments” language cannot be invoked as a talisman to defeat 
liability in cases like those that opened this Essay.168 The Court might even take up 
Anthony Amsterdam’s forty-year-old suggestion to impose an explicit regulatory 
regime on policing, prohibiting all searches and seizures that are not “conducted 
pursuant to and in conformity with either legislation or police departmental rules and 
regulations.”169 
Or take the three recent cases in which the Supreme Court confronted blatant ra-
cial injustice—Foster (striking jurors based on race), Buck (capital sentencing 
infected by race), and Peña-Rodriguez (biased juror). A recognition of widespread 
racial inequality and bias in the criminal justice system would counsel in favor of 
broader constitutional protection to bring about deeper institutional change. To pre-
vent attorneys from striking jurors based on race, the Court could take up the recom-
mendations of Justices Marshall and Breyer that peremptory strikes be declared per 
se unconstitutional.170 To prevent racial discrimination in the administration of the 
death penalty, the Court could correct its wrong turn in McCleskey v. Kemp, where 
it dismissed extreme racial disparities as “an inevitable part of our criminal justice 
system” and not constitutionally cognizable.171 To ensure that defendants are judged 
by impartial juries, the Court could clarify how a defendant can prove that people of 
color have been systematically excluded from jury pools in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment’s fair cross-section requirement.172 These would be system-oriented 
solutions to systemic problems.  
The difficulty is that the prevailing influence of the Few Bad Apples narrative 
makes it less likely that the Court will recognize or redress patterns of misconduct in 
the future. And the problem is self-perpetuating. The more the courts rule against 
civil rights claims, the more it will seem to judicial actors that civil rights claims lack 
merit and that misconduct is rare. In turn, courts will be more likely to continue to 
contract substantive rights and erect procedural barriers to relief.  
Is it possible that our cultural currents could shift? There are some encouraging 
signs. The proliferation of viral videos and the emergence of the Black Lives Matter 
movement have made it harder to see the problem of police violence as isolated, race-
neutral, or independent of discrimination across a range of spheres.173 Ferguson 
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opened the eyes of millions of Americans to unequal and exploitative practices in 
law enforcement, validating complaints long made in communities of color.174 
Universities are grappling with the legacy of slavery, in some cases renaming storied 
institutions, abandoning insignia, creating reparations-like programs for the ances-
tors of enslaved people, and committing funding to diversify their faculties. Across 
the South, Confederate monuments are beginning to come down and local popula-
tions are renaming streets and highways that lionize secessionists. The terms “mass 
incarceration” and “white supremacy” can be found on the lips of mainstream 
Democratic and Republican officials alike.  
The Few Bad Apples narrative is being contested even at the Supreme Court. In 
a forceful dissent in Utah v. Strieff, Justice Sotomayor disputed the majority’s char-
acterization of the risks of abuse that would follow from its decision not to apply the 
exclusionary rule. “Respectfully,” she insisted, “nothing about this case is iso-
lated.”175 Citing Justice Department investigations, she demonstrated that many cities 
and towns have thousands of outstanding warrants. She criticized the majority for 
failing to explain why Edward Strieff’s case was isolated or “how a defendant can 
prove that his arrest was the result of ‘widespread’ misconduct.”176 Indeed, evidence 
of systemic misconduct is not easily uncovered during suppression hearings in crimi-
nal cases, and relatively few jurisdictions have been the subject of a federal 
investigation capable of uncovering patterns of abuse. Justice Sotomayor also sought 
to demonstrate how the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence overall has 
conferred too much discretion on police and given them too much control over 
individuals’ liberty: 
We must not pretend that the countless people who are routinely targeted 
by police are “isolated.” They are the canaries in the coal mine whose 
deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this atmos-
phere. . . . They are the ones who recognize that unlawful police stops 
corrode all our civil liberties and threaten all our lives. Until their voices 
matter too, our justice system will continue to be anything but.177  
At the same time, President Donald Trump and Attorney General Jeff Sessions 
have doubled down on the Few Bad Apples narrative. They perceive a War on Cops 
and have disputed the notion that there are any systemic problems in law enforce-
ment. Trump has railed against “political correctness,” and Sessions is backing away 
from civil rights enforcement. Just five weeks into his tenure, the new Attorney 
General withdrew the intentional discrimination claim in the case against Texas’s 
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voter identification law, and he has shifted resources from ensuring equal voting op-
portunity to pressuring states to purge people from the rolls. 
Ironically, this Administration’s rhetoric and actions might have the effect of ex-
posing the insufficiency and falsity of the Few Bad Apples narrative. The President 
campaigned on a vision of purging the United States of undocumented immigrants, 
curtailing legal immigration, and barring Muslims from the country. He articulated 
that vision in inflammatory terms not often heard in the modern political arena.178 By 
speaking with such open animus based on race and religion, and doing so from the 
highest political perch in the land, Trump is exploding the fiction that we live in a 
post-racial society. When white supremacists with tiki torches converged on 
Charlottesville, Virginia, in August 2017 and one of them killed a counter-protestor, 
the president failed to condemn racial prejudice with anything approaching moral 
clarity. His response helped renew a national conversation about race in America. 
President Trump also styled himself as a “law and order” candidate, and six 
months into his administration he began to articulate what that meant. In July 2017, 
he advocated police violence in a speech that was widely condemned by law enforce-
ment leaders.179 This kind of statement may draw more, not less, attention to the need 
for police reform. Similarly, September 2017 saw a wave of protests against police 
violence by professional athletes, most of whom began kneeling or locking arms dur-
ing the national anthem at games only after the President lashed out in a public 
speech at the relatively few who had done so.180 
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Will the Few Bad Apples narrative continue to have resonance in our society, and 
by extension in the judiciary? Or will emerging social movements and salient events 
cause Americans and jurists to acknowledge the systemic nature of civil rights 
infringement? The answer to this question will play a significant role in whether the 
future of the Constitution is more or less protective of the individual liberty, privacy, 
and dignity.  
